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ACIS - 1510/85
7 October 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM:

[redacted]
Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff

SUBJECT:

SCC-XXIX Decision Document [redacted]

1. This "fast-track" memorandum is solely for your information. This package is important, but I think we have it very much under control. [redacted]

2. We have been working intensely for the past several weeks with the rest of the Executive Branch to coordinate and complete the decision document (copy attached) for the next round (XXIX (29)) of the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC). This document is thick and dense reading but worth a few minutes of review when you have the time. [redacted]

3. The Fall SCC round is scheduled to begin October 9, 1985 in Geneva.

4. This document was sent to the NSC Staff on or about Saturday, 28 September. Although I thought originally that the issues might be discussed by the Senior Arms Control Group last week, if time permitted, it is now clear that there will be no such discussion; rather, Mr. McFarlane will resolve the questions with the President and issue guidance as needed. [redacted]

5. As you will see by looking at the document, as well as by my list below, the Executive Branch is once again highly fractured over its plans for the SCC this autumn. This has been the case for the last several years for the SCC and is likely to continue for some time. In the face of all of these disagreements, we have done our best to ensure that the decision document contains all of the information needed for a reasonably balanced, if not wise, decision. In some cases, even when we were trying to be helpful as "a friend of the process", our proposed text was rejected by one or more policy agencies at the working level. [redacted]

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6. On behalf of US intelligence and for you, we have forced into this paper a variety of words concerning the intelligence aspects of many of these SCC compliance issues. We have done so reluctantly and only when it was vital. In addition, on a few occasions, I have used your title again in order that certain views are expressed which I believe are important for the President and his National Security Advisor to have in order to fully understand the issue. None of these inserts reflect new material or new positions of significance; in fact, most of these points are repeats of what I forced into a similar document for you in the Spring, 1985 and twice in 1984.

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7. Specifically, I have expressed for you views on US policy in the following places and on these topics (see asterisks):

-- Page 11, paragraph 4:

-- Page 32, bottom full paragraph
and page 33, top paragraph:

-- Page 35, bottom paragraph
and page 36, top paragraph:

Encryption of Telemetry

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8. In addition to policy matters, many of the issues contained in this document have important intelligence assessment, and sources and methods, implications attached to them and, thus, required comments by us. All of these comments are either restatements from previous SCC Decision Documents or clear extensions of those ideas. These comments can be found on the following pages (see asterisks):

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The value of destruction
procedures

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Backfire Bomber

ABM Rapid Reload

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-- Page 28, middle paragraph and
Page 30, middle paragraph:

Territorial Defense and
Concurrent Operations

-- Page 32, bottom half of page
and top half of page 33:

-- Page 36, top paragraph:

-- Page 39, bottom paragraph:

SNDVs

-- Page 42, bottom full paragraph:

SAM Upgrade

-- Page 44, middle paragraph:

Mobile ABM System
Components [REDACTED]

9. This document is important because decisions from it will be used to generate the draft instructions for the US SCC Component. Based on past experience and what the NSC Staff told me last week, I believe we will get everything we asked for here. I will be astounded otherwise. [REDACTED]

10. I regret to tell you that this memorandum was delayed for several days because of the press of business last week with Gorbachev's visit to Paris. That delay was not significant, however, because the Executive Branch was incapable last week (and this weekend) of dealing with this issue anyway. [REDACTED]

11. If there is anything further we can do to assist you here, please call and let me know. [REDACTED]

Attachment:
As stated

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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WASHINGTON

September 28, 1985

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Decisions Regarding Instructions for the SCC Session
Beginning October 9, 1985

Attached is a paper prepared by the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) Backstopping Committee containing issues for decision regarding instructions for the next session of the SCC beginning on October 9, 1985.



William B. Staples
Executive Secretary

Attachment
As stated

THIS MEMO UNCLASSIFIED WHEN
SEPARATED FROM ATTACHMENT

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September 28, 1985

Decisions Regarding Instructions for the SCC Session
Beginning October 9, 1985

Introduction

Decisions are needed to complete the instructions for the next session of the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) which is scheduled to begin on October 9, 1985. Decisions on whether to pursue certain issues and approval of approaches to take in pursuing issues are needed as follows:

Section I. How to respond to the Soviet proposal for an additional SLBM launcher dismantling procedure. (Pages 3-10)

Section II. Issues on which decisions are needed on whether to pursue in SCC-XXIX and, if pursued, require approval of an approach to take.

- | | |
|--|---------------|
| A. A Certain SLBM's Throw-weight | (Pages 10-12) |
| B. SS-16 | (Pages 12-15) |
| C. BWC | (Pages 15-16) |
| D. Mobile Missile Verification | (Pages 16-18) |
| E. Backfire Bomber | (Pages 18-23) |
| F. ABM Rapid Reload | (Pages 23-25) |
| G. Deployment of Mobile ICBMs at Former SS-7 Sites | (Pages 25-27) |

Section III. Matters which all agencies agree should be pursued in SCC-XXIX, but on which decisions are needed on the approach to take.

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|--|---------------|
| A. Territorial Defense | (Pages 27-30) |
| B. <div data-bbox="277 1383 961 1465" style="border: 1px solid black; width: 421px; height: 39px; display: inline-block;"></div> | (Pages 31-33) |

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Section IV. Matters which all agencies agree should be pursued and on which there is an agreed approach; approval of the recommended approach is needed.

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|---|---------------|
| A. Krasnoyarsk Radar | (Pages 33-35) |
| B. Encryption of Telemetry | (Pages 35-37) |
| C. SS-X-25 | (Pages 37-39) |
| D. SNDV Limits | (Pages 39-41) |
| E. SAM Upgrade | (Pages 41-42) |
| F. Mobile ABM System Components | (Pages 42-44) |
| G. Preagreed Messages for the Common Understanding on Unexplained Nuclear Incidents | (Pages 44-45) |

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Section V. How to respond to compliance concerns previously raised by the Soviet Union. SCC papers have been written with consensus positions. Approval is needed for these positions. Appropriate provisions have been included in the draft instructions. (Page 45)

- A. Article XII of the SALT II Treaty
- B. ABM Testing Activities
- C. Pave Paws Radars
- D. SDI
- E. Modernization of the Thule (and Fylingdales) Radar
- F. Titan II Launchers

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I. How to Respond to the Soviet Proposal for an Additional SLBM Launcher Dismantling Procedure

During SCC-XXVIII, the Soviet side proposed that an additional SLBM launcher dismantling option, originally negotiated in 1979, be made available, in addition to the 1974 SALT I Dismantling or Destruction (D or D) Procedures,* by means of a Common Understanding. The Soviet proposal and possible US responses are addressed in the SCC Backstopping Committee decision paper on dismantling or destruction procedures, forwarded to the NSC on August 30, 1985.

Options for Decision:

Option 1: Decline to negotiate/finalize the SSBN or any other D or D procedures.

Option 2: Defer discussion of D or D procedures.

Option 3: Seek completion of the 1979 Procedures sufficient only to create basis for establishing a system of SNDV accountability. Any new procedures negotiated would apply only until a new strategic agreement is reached, or until interim restraint ceases.

Approaches

1. Decline Soviet Offer

State and ACDA believe that, if the decision is to decline the Soviet offer, the approach should be along the following lines:

The US Component would inform the Soviet side that the Soviet proposal is not in the interest of the US. The US Component would be authorized to ask the Soviet side why it had made its proposal.

OSD and JCS believe that, if the decision is to decline the Soviet offer, the approach should be along the following lines:

*Protocol on Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, For Strategic Offensive Arms, July 3, 1974.

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The US Component would inform the Soviet side that, after careful study of the Soviet proposal, the US does not believe that changes to the 1974 Procedures are necessary or desirable. The US Component would add that the US wishes to continue to focus on the resolution of the compliance issues on the agenda of the SCC.

State and ACDA believe that we should not rule out the possibility of negotiating on other D or D procedures, even though we would be rejecting the Soviet proposal.

OSD believes that the Soviet offer should be definitely rejected.

2. Defer discussion of D or D procedures

All agencies agree that, if the decision is to defer discussion of D or D procedures, the approach should be along the following lines:

The US Component would inform the Soviet side that the USG has given the Soviet proposal careful study, and will continue to do so, but believes that any discussion of the Soviet proposal should be deferred until a later date in view of the brevity of, and full agenda for, this session. The US Component would also inform the Soviet side that this response should not be interpreted as either acceptance or rejection of the Soviet proposal. The US Component would be authorized to ask the Soviet side why it had made its proposal.

3. Seek Completion of the 1979 Procedures Sufficient Only to Create a Basis for Establishing a System of SNDV Accountability

All agencies agree that, if the decision is to review all D or D procedures, the approach should be along the following lines:

The US Component would inform the Soviet side that, taking into account the Soviet proposal of April 12, the US believes it would be useful for the sides to review in the SCC all dismantling or destruction procedures applicable to systems captured under the SALT II Treaty. The US Component would add that such a review would be undertaken with the prior understanding that it would encompass mutual agreement between the Parties on the accountability of SALT II limited systems.

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The US Component would inform the Soviet side that the sides should seek agreement to use a single set of agreed 1974 and 1979 Procedures to implement relevant provisions of the SALT I and SALT II agreements under interim restraint policies of the Parties. These procedures, once agreed, would be applicable to all systems dismantled or destroyed since 1979. They would include appropriate SALT II notification requirements, but would exclude procedures applicable to the conversion of heavy bombers. The US Component would make clear that this proposal is not to be taken as a precedent for START.

The US Component would note that, in this context, the Soviet proposal of April 12, 1985, with the bracketed US text, would be considered with: (1) Soviet acceptance of the legitimacy of US Titan II dismantlement procedures; and, (2) a ban on the conversion of bombers to non-accountable types.

Agency Positions:

State supports Option 3. State believes that it is in the US national interest to negotiate with the USSR on selected D-or-D procedures. In return for US agreement to the Soviet proposal to add a new SSBN D-or-D procedure to the 1974 SALT I D-or-D procedures, the US should propose a D-or-D package to deal with dismantling, destruction and conversion of heavy bombers to pursue the issue of the Soviet violation of the SALT II SNDV limit of 2504. This US proposal would be a positive step in support of US policy by demonstrating our commitment to taking a vigorous approach to Soviet noncompliance. It would also be consistent with the President's new policy of interim mutual restraint, would improve on the existing method for determining the SALT-accountability for heavy bombers, and would not interfere with START. Finally, any possible advantage to the Soviets resulting from the additional SSBN D-or-D procedure would be offset by the new heavy bomber procedures which could force the Soviets to destroy up to 30 Bison bombers or other SNDVs.

In the President's June 10 decision to seek to establish an interim framework of truly mutual restraint, the Soviet Union is called upon, inter alia, to take positive concrete steps to correct its non-compliance and to resolve our other compliance concerns. The impact of this call is reinforced by specific US proposals to resolve compliance problems.

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The crux of the present Soviet SNDV violation lies in the fact that the USSR claims it has converted a number of Bison bombers into tankers, while the Intelligence Community assesses that the aircraft are still bombers

This problem could be dealt with in the context of D-or-D negotiations. Whereas SLBM and ICBM D-or-D is included in the SALT I procedures, SALT I provides no procedures for heavy bombers. Establishing a system of heavy bomber accountability based on the 1979 D-or-D procedures could help resolve the current Soviet SNDV violation issue and help prevent it from arising in the future. Beyond the 1979 procedures, we would, specifically, ban conversion of heavy bombers to non-accountable types such as tankers.

In order to take advantage of this opportunity to improve the accounting for heavy bombers and pursue resolution of the SNDV violation, the US must engage the Soviets on their proposal to negotiate on SSBN D-or-D procedures. The Soviets have proposed to add the 1979 "scoop-out" D-or-D procedure to the 1974 "trisection" procedure, presumably to facilitate conversion of SSBNs to non-SALT-limited purposes. As a practical matter, the additional procedure would apply only to the conversion of Yankee-class submarines. Two Yankee SSBNs are currently being dismantled, and only two more are projected to be dismantled in compensation for new SSBN construction and thus will become candidates for the 1979 procedure. The Soviets could use the current procedure for converting SSBNs even if we reject their proposal.

While it is impossible to project with certainty how many additional, if any, of these submarines would be converted if the 1979 procedure were adopted, the small number of candidate submarines is offset by the price the Soviets would have to pay in heavy bombers or other SNDVs. The Soviets would have to decide whether to D-or-D up to 30 Bison (which the Intelligence Community assesses are bombers) or an equal number of other SNDVs in order to return to compliance with the SALT II SNDV limit. This requirement would offset any financial or procedural advantage to the Soviets from the alternative SSBN conversion procedure. We believe that this trade-off would favor US interests.

Some argue that the new SSBN procedure would cost the US more than the present procedure, though we do not plan to convert any SSBNs. However, the new procedure need not in any way affect US operations, since even under the Soviet proposal we would remain free to use the current procedure.

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Proposing the procedures we envision would not undermine START. We would deal with two issues: bombers and SLBM launchers. Neither issue would set undesirable precedents for START. In addition, as part of the interim mutual restraint regime, new procedures would not signal the Soviets that we do not anticipate a START agreement soon. The Soviets understand that the interim mutual restraint regime will end with a new START agreement, if not before. Indeed, since D-or-D procedures will be required under a new START regime, current procedures that are in our interest may be extended beyond the period of interim mutual restraint.

Finally, it is not appropriate to postpone engaging the Soviets on D-or-D issues pending completion of the November DoD report on interim mutual restraint. The policy of interim mutual restraint is under continuous review and the November report is the first milestone on what could be a long road. The USG may wish to consider the desirability of proposing other D-or-D procedures -- in addition to a proposal on bombers and SSBN conversion -- in the coming months. But the Soviet SNDV violation warrants the immediate and limited response we propose to make.

OSD and JCS strongly oppose negotiation or finalization of the 1979 SALT II D-or-D procedures. These agencies therefore support Option 1.

Adoption of the 1979 D-or-D procedures for SSBNs would not be in the military interest of the United States. The US has no plans for converting dismantled Poseidon SSBNs to cruise missile platforms or attack submarines, so we would not benefit from new procedures. The 1979 procedures would, however, apparently facilitate such ongoing and future Soviet conversion of dismantled Yankee-class SSBNs. As the President stated, the Yankee submarine reconfigured to carry modern, long-range sea-launched cruise missiles "constitutes a threat to US and Allied security similar to the original Yankee-class submarine," raising "concerns about their compliance with the spirit of the agreement." It is definitely not in our military interest to finalize procedures that would aid the USSR in returning dismantled SSBNs to operation as attack submarines or cruise missile platforms, thereby increasing the threat to the United States or its Allies.

There are no compelling reasons to adopt new procedures at this time. SALT I D-or-D procedures have sufficed until now, and will probably continue to do so for the indefinite future. Moreover, cost analysis indicates the SALT I D-or-D procedures are less costly for the US than were we to opt to shift to the new procedure.

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Adoption of new, agreed D-or-D procedures would not resolve the issue of the Soviet SNDV violation. The SNDV problem does not lie in disagreement on the number of missile launchers or bombers that have been dismantled. While the Intelligence Community agrees that the Soviets have converted a small number of Bisons from bombers into tankers (despite the absence of agreed procedures), the Soviets are claiming as tankers other Bisons that the IC assesses are really bombers. We do not believe it is in our interest to "trade" Soviet dismantlement of SNDVs in excess of the allowed limit -- which the USSR is obliged to do anyway -- in return for agreement to SSBN D-or-D procedures that could increase the threat to the US.

Nor would it be appropriate to seek resolution of Soviet concerns on Titan launcher dismantlement by "trading" this for agreement to the 1979 procedures. The procedures we are using in Titan dismantlements are in full compliance with SALT requirements. Consequently, it would not be in our interest to finalize the 1979 procedures in order to gain Soviet admission that US Titan dismantlements do indeed meet arms control obligations.

Adoption of the SALT II procedures would not represent a vigorous approach to Soviet non-compliance. On the contrary, it could signal that we intend to observe SALT II for many years to come in spite of ongoing, uncorrected Soviet violations. NSDD-173 stated that US decisions on continued SALT observance would be made in light of Soviet corrective actions, reversal of the Soviet military build-up, and active Soviet pursuit of arms reductions in Geneva. To enhance the status of SALT II in the absence of these factors could imply tacit US acceptance of Soviet violations.

Finally, adoption of the 1979 procedures could have an adverse impact on START. To finalize them after ignoring them for almost six years would signal that we do not anticipate a START agreement for a number of years to come -- a signal we do not wish to send. In addition, their adoption could prejudice the procedures we want to negotiate in the context of START.

ACDA supports Option 2. ACDA believes that the US should defer responding to the Soviet proposal on SLBM conversion procedures until the US determines what package of D-or-D procedures would be appropriate for a continued period of mutual restraint. Parallel to the development of the DoD report to the President on mutual restraint and proportional responses, the SCC

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Backstopping Committee, together with the ACVC, should be tasked to develop recommended D-or-D procedures that would be in the US interest to negotiate with the Soviets, taking into account SALT I and SALT II D-or-D procedures, should the President decide to continue with some form of mutual restraint. In the interim, we will continue to draw on the 1979 D-or-D procedures, as appropriate, to judge Soviet compliance on SALT II.

The SCC Commissioner supports engaging the Soviets on this subject in SCC-XXIX. His views and recommended approach follow:*

The US decision concerning a response to the Soviet proposal should be taken in the context of the June 10 decision on interim restraint, the upcoming November 19-20 meeting, the report due on November 15 regarding US responses to Soviet non-compliance, and the recent decision to abbreviate the upcoming SCC session.

Most important, I believe that the US approach should seek to maximize achievement of US interests in:

- pressing for resolution of compliance issues as stated by the President in connection with his two reports to the Congress on Soviet non-compliance;

- confident monitoring of Soviet strategic systems and in maintaining an agreed data base on such systems; and

- avoiding prejudice to positions and objectives on dismantling or destruction, and monitoring and verification thereof, being taken or to be taken by the US in current negotiations.

In the latter regard, I believe that the greatest risk of prejudice to those positions and objectives lies in allowing, during this period of negotiations on new agreements, continued Soviet use of unilateral approaches to criteria for accountability based on procedures for dismantling or destruction that are obsolescent, incompletely agreed, or simply lacking.

In my view, an approach to this subject along the following lines at the upcoming session of the SCC would be consistent with all of the above.

*Quoted from his memorandum of September 18, 1985, to the Chairman, SCC Backstopping Committee.

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We would inform the Soviets that:

-- the US is not interested in discussing the Soviet proposal by itself as a limited approach to the broader problem of D or D procedures;

-- the US would be interested in a more comprehensive approach to the matter of procedures to be followed during this current interim period. Such an approach could lead to agreement on procedures that provide the necessary basis for agreement on a data base, could help to resolve several matters currently on the SCC agenda, and could help to preclude more such issues arising, pending conclusion of a new strategic arms agreement;


-- the US is only interested if the Soviet side agrees that it would be useful to negotiate interim procedures with the objective of providing appropriate criteria for establishing and maintaining an agreed data base regarding strategic offensive arms; and that

-- if the Soviet side is positively disposed to such an approach, the US will present a proposal for interim procedures at SCC-XXX, and will expect a proposal from the USSR at that same time.

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The DCI is not taking a position, based on intelligence material, on which policy option is chosen for this issue.



II. Issues on Which Decisions are Needed on Whether to Pursue in SCC-XXIX and, if Pursued, Require Approval of an Approach to Take.

A. A Certain SLBM's Throw-weight

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The background of this issue is contained in an SCC Working Group Paper prepared for SCC-XXVIII, dated April 10, 1985, and circulated at a higher level of classification.

This matter was considered by the SCC Working Group prior to SCC-XXVII (Fall '84) and SCC-XXVIII (Spring '85), and a USG decision was made not to raise it in those sessions [redacted]

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[redacted] The President's finding on this matter, contained in an annex, is classified codeword and judges the Soviets to be in technical violation on this issue.

There are two issues for decision: (1) whether this issue should be raised in SCC-XXIX, and (2) if raised, what approach should be taken.

Options for Decision:

Option 1: Do not raise this matter in SCC-XXIX.

Option 2: Raise this issue as a matter of concern and request clarification in a manner sensitive to intelligence sources and methods.

Consensus Approach:

(see Codeword Annex)

Agency Positions:

State, JCS, ACDA, the DCI and the SCC Commissioner support Option 1. They believe this matter should not be raised in view of sources and methods considerations. *

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OSD supports Option 2.

OSD notes that the President has judged that the SLBM is a technical violation of the political commitment to the SALT II Treaty. While the missile clearly violates the Treaty, it is not really as destructive as the SS-19. However, the legitimization of the technique used on the SLBM, if applied to a larger Soviet missile such as the SS-18, could result in a missile that violates the Treaty both in a technical and substantive sense. Since accepting Soviet behavior in the case of the SLBM threatens to unravel the critical throw-weight definition of the SALT II Treaty--and indeed of our START proposal--OSD believes that this issue must be raised with the Soviet Union as a serious compliance concern.

OSD believes that the sources and methods problems involved in raising the SLBM issue are manageable. For example, we have announced publicly for a decade which Soviet missiles are MIRV-capable and which carry PBVs and which do not. However we have made the determination, the Soviets must be used to the idea that we are able to do so independently of whether telemetry is encrypted or not. They cannot expect that such a basic fact about one of their missiles will go unnoticed. Significant aspects of this missile system are treated at the secret level in other intelligence publications on compliance.

OSD believes that if it is decided to raise this issue, the approach should be as follows: The US Commissioner would advise the Soviets that the US wishes to raise as a matter of concern, request clarification, and seek corrective action from the Soviets regarding the new liquid fuel propellant SLBM first flight tested in June 1983. In particular, the US would note its serious compliance concerns and seek clarification regarding the compatibility of that SLBM, which has an "other appropriate device" for dispensing and targeting two or more RVs, with Article IX, Paragraph 1 (e) of the SALT II Treaty. The US Component would report any Soviet response to Washington for consideration before proceeding with any further discussion on the issue.

B. SS-16 ICBM

The question of possible SS-16 ICBM deployment has been raised in each of the past six SCC sessions. The Soviets have

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stated that they have no SS-16 ICBMs in their operational missile forces; that they have not produced, tested, or deployed the SS-16 ICBM since the signing of the SALT II Treaty; and that they are not doing anything contrary to the SALT II Treaty. During SCC-XXVIII, the US side added to its position a request that the Soviets dismantle facilities at Plesetsk historically associated with the SS-16.

The President's February 7, 1985, Report to the Congress contains the following finding:

The US Government reaffirms the judgment made in the January 1984 Report. While the evidence is somewhat ambiguous and we cannot reach a definitive conclusion, the available evidence indicates that the mobile missile activities at Plesetsk in the four areas historically associated with the SS-16 are a probable violation of the USSR's legal obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of SALT II prior to 1981 when the Treaty was pending ratification, and a probable violation of a political commitment subsequent to 1982.

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The issues for decision are: (1) whether to pursue the question of SS-16 ICBM deployment in SCC-XXIX, and (2) if so, what approach to take.

Options for Decision:

Option 1: Do not pursue the question of SS-16 ICBM deployment in SCC-XXIX. The US Commissioner would be authorized to note that this issue remains open in the SCC.

Option 2: Continue to pursue the question of SS-16 ICBM deployment in SCC-XXIX.

Consensus Approach

If the decision is to continue to pursue the matter of the deployment of the SS-16 ICBM in SCC-XXIX, all agencies agree that

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the approach should be along the following lines (this approach is substantively unchanged from that taken in SCC-XXVIII):

The US Component would (1) again state the finding of the President's February 1, 1985, Report to Congress which reaffirms the finding from the January 1984 Report, (2) reiterate that US concerns on this matter remain, (3) strongly press the Soviets to provide unambiguous information which can be validated by NTM regarding the location and disposition of SS-16s in existence at the time of the signing of SALT II, (4) repeat briefly other points made in previous discussions of this issue, including asking the Soviet side whether it can provide some alternative means of assuring the US that SS-16 ICBMs are not deployed at Plesetsk, and (5) continue to press the Soviets to dismantle the facilities at Plesetsk traditionally associated with the SS-16 as one means of alleviating US concerns that the SS-16 is deployed there. If the Soviet side does not present significant new information regarding the SS-16 ICBM, the US Commissioner is authorized to cease discussion of this matter for this session. In the process, he should make clear to the Soviet side the US assessment of their highly negative contribution and that the issue remains open in the SCC.

The US Component would be authorized to draw upon the SCC Working Group paper "Preparation for SCC-XXVIII: Possible SS-16 ICBM deployment: Overview and update," March 15, 1985, and the update of that paper, dated September 3, 1985.

Agency Positions:

State, JCS, ACDA, and the SCC Commissioner support Option 1. They believe that, pending evaluation of recent intelligence information, further pursuit of this matter at this time would not be productive.

OSD supports Option 2. OSD believes that evidence of the replacement of the SS-16, a probable violation of SALT II, with the SS-X-25, a clear violation of SALT II, is not corrective action. We should pursue this issue if only to possibly obtain additional information about the Soviet modernization efforts at Plesetsk.

OSD believes that the timing and nature of the Soviet activities at Plesetsk clearly strengthen the President's finding that the Soviets have probably violated the SS-16 deployment

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prohibition.

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The DCI notes that OSD's interpretation of the activities at Plesetsk is one of the possible interpretations; it seems clear that the policy decision is not directly contingent upon a specific interpretation of Soviet activities at Plesetsk. *

C. Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

The US has noted that Soviet actions with respect to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) and other agreements could affect future progress in the limitation and reduction of strategic arms in every SCC session since the Spring of 1981, nine sessions in all. The Soviet side has maintained that this is not an appropriate subject for the SCC to consider and that it is strictly abiding by the 1925 Geneva Convention and the BWC. During SCC-XXVIII, the Soviet side stated that it was not authorized to accept the US side's statement.

The issues for decision are: (1) whether to repeat the message regarding Soviet actions with respect to the BWC in SCC-XXIX, and (2) if so, what approach to take.

Options for Decision:

Option 1: Do not repeat the message regarding Soviet actions with respect to the BWC in SCC-XXIX.

Option 2: Repeat the message regarding Soviet actions with respect to the BWC in SCC-XXIX.

Consensus Approach

All agencies agree that if the decision is to repeat the message in SCC-XXIX, the approach should be along the following lines (this approach is unchanged from that taken in SCC-XXVIII):

With regard to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the US Component would, in a manner consistent with that in which

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it was done in recent SCC sessions, reaffirm the view that Soviet actions with respect to this and other agreements could affect future progress in the limitation and reduction of strategic arms. In conveying this view, the US Component would take care to avoid implying that resolution of the BWC issue is a prerequisite for any specific actions or decisions in other areas.

Agency Positions:

State, ACDA, and the SCC Commissioner support Option 1. State believes that though this compliance issue is important, it should not be raised in the SCC because the mandate of the SCC does not extend to the 1925 Geneva convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. State and ACDA note that, at SCC-XXVIII, the Soviet side refused to accept the US statement. They believe that no constructive purpose would be served by continuing to repeat this message in the SCC and that it should continue to be vigorously pursued through other diplomatic channels.

OSD and JCS support Option 2. OSD believes that evidence of Soviet BWC violations is stronger than it has ever been and, hence, there is no reason to depart from our practice of raising this issue in the SCC.

D. Mobile Missile Accountability and Verification

In SCC-XXVIII, the Soviet side advised the US side of deployment of 18 SS-25 mobile ICBMs. Given the Soviet notification of deployment, questions have arisen regarding the meaning of "deployment" in the context of mobile ICBM accountability. The US Component was not instructed to address this subject during SCC-XXVIII. A Soviet advisor, however, during SCC-XXVIII, stated in response to a question from a US advisor that deployment in the context of mobile missiles "...meant practically the same thing that future deployment of the US Midqetman missile meant. ...it meant 'bringing into the same state of readiness as would be the case with strategic missiles.' 'Deployment' of mobiles may not be agreed upon, but both sides understood what it meant."

The issues for decision are: (1) whether to raise the subject of mobile missile accountability and verification in SCC-XXIX, and (2) if so, what approach to take.

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Options for Decision:

Option 1: Do not raise the subject of mobile missile accountability and verification in SCC-XXIX.

Option 2: Raise the subject of mobile missile accountability and verification in SCC-XXIX.

Consensus Approach:

All agencies agree, except as noted below, that if the decision is to raise the subject of mobile missile verification, the approach should be along the following lines:

The US Commissioner would make the following points with the Soviet side with regard to the accountability of mobile ICBMs:

- In SCC-XXVIII, the Soviet side advised the US side on the basis of "good will" of the deployment of 18 SS-X-25 mobile ICBM launchers. The US side has in the past advised the Soviet side that we view the testing and deployment of this second new type of light ICBM as a clear violation of the Soviet Union's SALT II commitment. We have not changed our view, but in view of the Soviet "good will" report, we must ask the following questions:
- It is the understanding of the US, consistent with Article VI of the SALT II Treaty, that the launchers of mobile ICBMs become accountable when they reach the final stage of construction, specifically after they have been brought out of the facility where their final assembly has been performed. Is this the understanding of the Soviet side?
- If the Soviet side agrees that mobile ICBM launchers become accountable in accordance with the provisions of Article VI, the US Commissioner would indicate that this introduces a new verification problem that should be addressed. In this regard, he would ask the Soviet side how they would ensure verification by national technical means of the numbers of mobile ICBM launchers that are brought out of final assembly facilities.

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- If the Soviet side does not agree that mobile ICBM launchers become accountable in accordance with the provisions of Article VI, the US Commissioner would request that the Soviet side provide its views concerning when these launchers are to be considered accountable and seek guidance from Washington.

OSD and JCS believe that the US should not seek Soviet views regarding when the USSR considers SS-X-25 launchers to be accountable since the SALT II Treaty addresses this question.

State believes that it would be useful to seek Soviet views regarding when the USSR considers SS-X-25 launchers to be accountable to confirm that their view is the same as ours and to set the stage for the question on verification.

Agency Positions:

OSD, JCS, and ACDA support Option 1. They believe this subject should be dealt with in the NST. OSD believes that entering into a discussion of this issue in the SCC could prejudice our ability to achieve our verification goals in the START talks.

State and the SCC Commissioner support Option 2. They note that the question of mobile missile accountability is an integral part of the SNDV compliance issue and is properly handled in the SCC, as well as in the NST. Given the Soviet notification of deployment, failure to pursue this question would be tantamount to acquiescing in the Soviets' unilateral criterion of accountability and would totally ignore the critical problem of verification. State believes that such a discussion would not prejudice START because it would be undertaken in the context of SALT II.

E. Backfire Bomber

The Soviet Backfire statement, which is an integral part of the SALT II Treaty commitment, states that the Soviet side will not increase the production rate of this airplane as compared to the rate of June 18, 1979. As noted in Secretary of State Vance's June 21, 1979, submittal letter of the SALT II Treaty to the President, Soviet President Brezhnev confirmed to the US that the Backfire bomber production rate would not exceed 30 aircraft per year.

The Backfire statement also contained the Soviet commitment that it did not intend to give this airplane the capability of operating at intercontinental distances, it would not increase

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the radius of action of this airplane in such a way as to enable it to strike targets on the territory of the USA, and it did not intend to give it such a capability in any other manner, including by in-flight refueling.

The following are relevant findings from the President's Report of February 7, 1985:

Production Rate

The US Government judges that the Soviet Union is obligated to produce no more than 30 BACKFIRE bomber aircraft per year. While there are ambiguities concerning the data, there is evidence that the Soviet BACKFIRE production rate has been constant at slightly more than 30 per year.

Arctic Staging

The US Government judges that the temporary deployment of BACKFIRES of the Soviet Air Force (SAF) to Arctic bases in 1983 and 1984, bases used by Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA) BACKFIRES since 1975, is cause for concern and continued careful monitoring. By such temporary deployment of SAF BACKFIRES, the Soviet Union acted in a manner inconsistent with its political commitment in the June 1979 BACKFIRE statement not to increase the radius of action of this aircraft to enable it to strike the US territory, based on the US estimate of that radius of action.

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During SCC-XXVIII, the US side stated we had evidence of Arctic staging of Backfire aircraft and a Backfire production rate in excess of 30 per year, and requested clarification and appropriate corrective action.

The Soviet side responded that the Backfire's optimal operational radius of action is 2200 km; it is not fitted with

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
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refueling equipment; it is not equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 km; and it has not, in any other manner, been given the capability to operate at intercontinental range. Therefore, the aircraft cannot reach the continental US from any point on USSR territory, and concerns about Arctic staging are "totally groundless." As for the production rate of the aircraft, the Soviet side stated, "under instruction," that the rate does not exceed 30 per year.

Based on recent analysis, the annual Backfire production rate for 1984 and the first six months of 1985 is estimated to be about 28 aircraft. The uncertainty in this estimate is plus or minus several aircraft per year. However, the evidence that Backfire production did exceed 30 per year in earlier years remains.

Our understanding of Backfire C capabilities continues to evolve.



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While the preponderance of evidence weighs against an operational refueling capability, it is prudent to think that the Soviets designed and manufactured the Backfire C to have the potential for aerial refueling.

Based upon recent analysis, all intelligence agencies agree that the Backfire is an intermediate range bomber. All agencies also agree that under certain conditions, the Backfire has a limited technical capability to conduct strikes against targets in CONUS. On a one-way, subsonic all high-altitude mission, the Backfire could cover all or almost all of the continental US using either Arctic staging or aerial refueling. On a two-way, subsonic all high-altitude mission, even using both Arctic staging and aerial refueling, the Backfire could only cover about half of the continental US.

The issues for decision are: (1) whether to pursue the Backfire question in SCC-XXIX, and (2) if so, which approach to follow:

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Options for Decision:

Option 1: Do not pursue the matters of Backfire bomber production and intercontinental capability in SCC-XXIX. The US Commissioner would be authorized to note that these matters remain open in the SCC.

Option 2: Continue to pursue the matters of Backfire bomber production rate and intercontinental capability along the lines pursued in SCC-XXVIII and continue to seek Soviet clarifications.

Consensus Approaches:

1. Do not Pursue but Authorize to Note That These Matters Remain Open.

All agencies agree that if the decision is not to pursue the matters of Backfire bomber production rate and intercontinental capability in SCC-XXIX, the approach should be along the following lines:

The US Commissioner would be authorized to note that the matters of Backfire bomber production rate and intercontinental capability, raised during SCC-XXVIII, remain open in the SCC.

2. Pursue as in SCC-XXVIII.

All agencies agree that if the decision is to continue to pursue the matters of the production rate and intercontinental capability of the Backfire bomber as in SCC-XXVIII, the approach should be along the following lines (this approach would be substantively unchanged from that taken in SCC-XXVIII):

The US Component would review the exchanges on the matter of Backfire production rate at SCC-XXVIII, noting that Soviet responses were insufficient to clarify US concerns. The US Component would again remind the Soviet side that the US considers that the USSR has a political commitment to abide by General Secretary Brezhnev's commitment of June 1979, to President Carter that the production rate of the Backfire bomber would not exceed the rate as of June 1979 which he indicated was 30 per year at that time. The US continues to have evidence of Soviet activities that appear to be inconsistent with this commitment. The US Component would again seek clarification of this situation and Soviet views.

The US Component would reiterate that the US considers that the USSR has a political commitment to abide by its statement

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that the Soviet Union would not give the Backfire bomber the capability of operating at intercontinental distances and that it would not increase its radius of action in such a way as to enable it to strike targets on the territory of the USA; nor did it intend to give it such a capability in any other manner, including by in-flight refueling. The US continues to have evidence of Soviet activities which creates US concerns that these activities may be inconsistent with these political commitments. The US Component should again cite incidents of Arctic staging of USSR Backfire bombers. The US Component would seek clarification of this situation and if appropriate seek corrective action.

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The US Component would be authorized to draw upon the SCC Working Group paper, "Preparation for SCC-XXVIII: Backfire Bomber Production and Operating Capability," dated March 28, 1985, and the update of that paper dated September 3, 1985.

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Agency Positions:

State, JCS, ACDA and the SCC Commissioner support Option 1. They believe that, based on recent intelligence information, these issues should not be pursued at this time. They believe current intelligence information does not support a continued Backfire production rate in excess of 30 per year. State, ACDA and the SCC Commissioner note that the incidents of Arctic staging raised previously have not recurred.

OSD supports Option 2. OSD believes that Backfire has the capability to strike the US. Nothing in recent intelligence changes the validity of the President's decisions concerning Backfire noncompliance. Indeed, some of this intelligence strengthens the evidence of intercontinental strike capability. Thus, OSD believes we should continue to pursue the issue as it has been pursued in SCC-XXVIII.

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The DCI

[redacted] questions the wisdom of taking a policy position in anticipation of what the upcoming draft Compliance Report will contain or lead to as the resulting Presidential decision.

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F. ABM Rapid Reload

The matter of Soviet ABM rapid reload activity was raised with the Soviet side for the first time in SCC-XXVIII. The US side stated that evidence suggests that, during 1983, ABM launchers [redacted] were reloaded in a relatively short period of time, causing concern in the context of Article V of the ABM treaty. The Soviet side responded that the Soviet Union is not undertaking any rapid reload activities involving ABM interceptor missiles. In a later conversation, the Soviet Commissioner stated that the Soviet side understands rapid reload in the same manner as the sides understood it during negotiation of the ABM Treaty.

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The Soviet Commissioner also recalled a 1975 SALT II conversation regarding rapid reload of ICBM launchers in which Ambassador Johnson had said that he had in mind a matter of minutes, perhaps an hour or two, certainly not days. The Soviet Commissioner noted the US statement that rapid reload activity had been observed [redacted] in 1983 was unclear; it could be understood in various ways, for example, that only one hour or one day had elapsed after the launch of a missile, when the launcher was reloaded, or perhaps a full year.

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The President's Report, February 7, 1985, to the Congress included the following finding:

The US Government judges, on the basis of the evidence available, that the USSR's actions with respect to the rapid reload of ABM launchers constitute an ambiguous situation as concerns its legal obligations under the ABM Treaty not to develop systems for rapid reload. The Soviet Union's reload capabilities are a serious concern. This and other ABM-related Soviet activities suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

There are two issues for decision: (1) whether to continue to pursue this matter in SCC-XXIX, and (2) if pursued, approval of the consensus approach.

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Options for Decision:

Option 1: Do not pursue this matter in SCC-XXIX. The US Commissioner would be authorized to note that this matter remains open in the SCC.

Option 2: Continue to pursue this matter in SCC-XXIX.

Consensus Approach:

All agencies agree that if the decision is to raise this matter in SCC-XXIX, the approach should be along the following lines (this approach would be substantively unchanged from that pursued in SCC-XXVIII):

The US Component would reiterate its concern along the lines expressed in SCC-XXVIII, express US dissatisfaction with Soviet failure to provide information which would clarify its activities, and repeat the US request for clarification of Soviet activities observed during 1983 involving the apparent reload of ABM launchers in a relatively short period of time, in particular, how this activity is consistent with the provisions of Article V of the Treaty.

The US Component would be authorized to draw upon the SCC Working Group Paper, "Preparation for SCC-XXVIII: ABM Rapid Reload," dated April 5, 1985, and the update of that paper dated September 3, 1985.

OSD believes that, if the decision is to pursue this matter during SCC-XXIX, this issue could be better pursued by providing the Soviet side a date on which the reloading of ABM launchers at Sary Shagan in a relatively short period of time occurred. With reference to Amb. Johnson's statement quoted by the Soviet side, the US Component would indicate that this serves to approximate the time that elapsed during rapid reload activity observed by the US in 1983.

OSD believes, in addition, that the US Component should be authorized to explore further the Soviet side's understanding of the term "rapid reload" as it is used in the ABM Treaty.

State and ACDA believe that it would not be useful, and might be harmful, to discuss the meaning of "rapid" with the Soviets before the USG has an agreed position on its meaning.

JCS defers to the views of the Intelligence Community on the matter of providing a date to the Soviet side.

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Agency Positions:

State, ACDA, and the SCC Commissioner support Option 1. They believe that nothing will be gained by raising this issue, since that activity has not been repeated and since we have already put the Soviets on notice regarding the activity of concern.

OSD and JCS support Option 2. OSD believes that failure to pursue the rapid reload issue, in the absence of any attempt by the Soviet side to resolve our concern, would signal the Soviets that it is no longer a matter of serious concern and that Soviet protestations of innocence are an acceptable resolution of our compliance concerns.

The DCI believes there are risks to intelligence sources and methods in this issue but it is possible, if a decision is made to pursue this issue with the Soviet Union, to do so with minimal risk.

[redacted] Instead, the DCI believes the US could and should say to the Soviets that the Soviets themselves must surely know from their own ABM testing personnel the dates in question during 1983; the number cannot be large. In addition, the DCI is opposed on principle to providing the Soviets [redacted] again, the Soviets surely must know from their own ABM test program personnel [redacted]

[redacted] And the Soviets can be engaged on topic of reload intervals, from the negotiating record, without the actual numbers. Thus, in both cases, further exposure of US intelligence details should not be required.

G. Deployment of Mobile ICBMs at Former SS-7 Sites

Construction of mobile ICBM bases, probably for the SS-X-25 ICBM, at former SS-7 ICBM launch sites in the Soviet Union has raised concerns that these former ICBM sites might be used in a manner inconsistent with the political commitment of the Soviet Union under the Interim Agreement and its implementing Protocol on Procedures which prohibit use of facilities remaining at dismantled or destroyed ICBM sites for storage, support, or launch of ICBMs. In both SCC-XXVI (Spring '84) and SCC-XXVII (Fall '84) the US side noted the US concern regarding the potential inconsistency of these activities with the provisions of the Interim Agreement. The Soviet side responded in SCC-XXVII


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(Fall '84) that the facilities in question were not being used for storage, support, launch of ICBMs, or any other purposes contrary to the provisions of the Interim Agreement and the Protocol thereto. During SCC-XXVIII, the Soviet side, "by way of good will," stated that 18 launchers for mobile missiles had been deployed and confirmed informally that these were launchers for the SS-X-25.

The President's February 7, 1985, classified Report to the Congress contained the following finding:



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The issues for decision are: (1) whether we should pursue this matter in SCC-XXIX, and (2) if so, what approach to take.

Options for Decision:

Option 1: Do not pursue this matter pending the US assessment of relevant intelligence information.

Option 2: Remind the Soviet side that use of remaining facilities to support ICBMs at deactivated SS-7 sites would be a violation of Treaty commitments.

Consensus Approach:

All agencies agree that, if the decision is to pursue this matter in SCC-XXIX, the approach should be along the following lines:

The US Component would remind the Soviet side of the proper implementation of Paragraph 4, Section II, of the Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction and Notification Thereof, for Strategic Offensive Arms. The US Component would note that use of "remaining facilities" to support ICBMs at deactivated SS-7 sites would be a violation of

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Soviet commitments. The US Component would inform the Soviet side that the US is continuing to monitor closely current Soviet activities at former SS-7 sites.

OSD would request, in addition, that the Soviet side confirm that SS-X-25 mobile ICBM launchers have been deployed at bases constructed at

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Agency Positions:

State, OSD, JCS, and ACDA support Option 2. State, JCS, and ACDA believe Soviet activities are questionable and that there is utility in continuing to signal our concern in this "low-key" way. OSD notes that subsequent to warning the Soviets on this issue in the SCC, we have seen a pattern of use of former facilities at nearly all SS-X-25 sites. We must continue to pursue this issue.

The SCC Commissioner supports Option 1. The SCC Commissioner believes that we have already made the Soviet side well aware of our concerns in this regard and that restating those concerns, in view of the continuing assessment of intelligence information regarding Soviet activities at these sites, may unnecessarily reveal US uncertainties.

The DCI is not taking a position, based on intelligence material, on the policy options for this issue. The DCI notes, however, given the apparent significance of this issue, that asking the Soviets for more information about the status and location of their deployed mobile ICBMs would seem in the US interest.

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III. Matters Which all Agencies Agree Should be Pursued in SCC-XXIX, But on Which Decisions are Needed on the Approach to Take

A. Territorial Defense and Concurrent Operations

During SCC-XXVIII, the US side reviewed concerns about ABM and ABM-related activities which suggest that the Soviet Union may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. Listed among those concerns were the construction of LPARs, including the one at Krasnoyarsk; concurrent operation of air defense components and ABM system components*; R&D on new air

*Concurrent operation of air defense components and ABM system components were raised with the Soviet side only in conjunction with Territorial Defense.

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defense missiles with capabilities against some types of ballistic missiles; the possible development of mobile ABM components; and ABM rapid reload activities. Our expectation of corrective action or detailed explanations regarding these activities was made clear.

The Soviet side responded that the US has no grounds for its statements. On concurrent operations, they noted that past instances of certain contemporaneous but independent operation of air defense and ABM systems at Sary Shagan have been explained.

The DCI notes that since 1972 the Soviets have engaged in three separate categories of concurrent activities

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Activities in each category can be important to ABM, much less SAM, research and development. The Common Understanding signed in June 1985 limited further activities of the first type. Since the signing, we have noted no instances of such concurrent activities. However, we continue to be aware of instances in the other two categories.

The President's February 7, 1985, Report to the Congress addresses the matter of ABM Territorial Defense and made the following finding:

The US Government judges that the aggregate of the Soviet Union's ABM and ABM-related actions (e.g., radar construction, concurrent testing, SAM Upgrade, ABM rapid reload and ABM mobility) suggests that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

The complete finding for each item can be found in the section of this paper which addresses that item.

All agencies agree that this matter should be pursued in SCC-XXIX. A decision is required on the approach to take.

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Options for Decision:

Option 1: Do not pursue the matter of territorial defense as an issue in itself, but in the context of other ABM issues.

Option 2: Pursue the matter of territorial defense in SCC-XXIX as an issue in itself.

Consensus Approaches:

All agencies agree that, if the decision is to pursue this matter in the context of other ABM issues, the approach should be along the following lines:

The US Component would make clear, in addressing each specific ABM Treaty compliance question, that the Soviet activity in question, when considered with other Soviet ABM-related activities, suggests that the Soviet Union may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. The US Component would stress that it is incumbent upon the Soviet Union to provide explanations, or to take the necessary corrective action (depending upon the issue), which will allay our concerns.

All agencies agree that, if the decision is to pursue this matter in SCC-XXIX as an issue in itself, the approach should be along the following lines (this approach would be substantively unchanged from that taken in SCC-XXVIII):

The US Component would again review all the findings related to ABM territorial defense contained in the President's unclassified February 1, 1985, Report to the Congress and emphasize the totality and interrelationship of the following Soviet activities which may contribute to an ABM territorial defense: (a) the LPAR construction program particularly the Krasnoyarsk radar, (b) the possible development of mobile ABM components, (c) incidents of concurrent operation of ABM and SAM components, (d) evidence of Soviet actions with respect to SAM upgrade, and (e) Soviet rapid reload capabilities. The US Component would repeat that these activities have engendered serious concerns within the US that the Soviet Union may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

The US Component would again request an explanation regarding how these activities are consistent with Treaty commitments. The US Component would also repeat our request that the Soviet side provide adequate explanations regarding these ABM activities.

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The US Component would again stress that, during ABM Treaty negotiations, the Parties understood that LPARs were the key elements in providing a base for a territorial defense in that LPAR construction is clearly one of the long lead time items necessary for the deployment of such a defense. In this regard, such a blatant violation of the important Treaty limitations on LPARs, as the construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar can most certainly be characterized, is not only of the highest concern in itself but can only lead the US justifiably to regard other Soviet ABM-related activity, some of which may be ambiguous in terms of Treaty compliance, with suspicion. The US would stress that, in this light, the Soviet Union must bear the burden of explanation regarding how these activities are in compliance with Treaty commitments. It is therefore incumbent upon the Soviet Union, in addition to taking the necessary step of dismantling the Krasnoyarsk radar, to provide corrective actions or, at a minimum, to give clear and detailed explanations regarding this other activity. This is necessary in order to initiate a process which will allay these suspicions and achieve a mutual trust that is essential to our attempts to achieve new agreements in the future.

The DCI believes [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] if a decision is made to pursue this issue with the USSR, to do so with minimal risk.

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Agency Positions:

State, JCS, ACDA, and the SCC Commissioner support Option 1. State, JCS, and ACDA believe that not all of the ABM issues should be raised in depth, and therefore a thorough reiteration of the territorial defense issue as expressed in the President's Report to Congress would not be possible. Nonetheless, territorial defense is a part of each of the individual ABM compliance issues about which we believe we should express our concern again.

OSD supports Option 2. OSD believes that pursuing the issue of territorial defense as we did in SCC-XXVIII is important to express our concern over the totality and interrelationship of Soviet ABM activities that cause concern about Soviet compliance with this fundamental limitation of the ABM Treaty.

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IV. Matters Which All Agencies Agree Should be Pursued and on Which There is an Agreed Approach; Approval of the Recommended Approach is Needed

A. Krasnoyarsk Radar

During SCC-XXVIII, the US side cited the Krasnoyarsk radar as a violation of legal obligations assumed under the ABM Treaty. The US characterized the Soviet contention that this radar will be for tracking objects in outer space and national technical means of verification as implausible, and informed the Soviet side that corrective action, to include dismantlement of the radar, is required.

The Soviets reiterated specifics of the radar's alleged space track mission, and provided reasons as to why the radar could not be used in a ballistic missile early warning or ABM role. The Soviets protested the US finding of a violation, on the grounds that no such determination is possible before the radar begins to function, characterized US arguments as subjective assessments and conclusions, and characterized as "out of the question" the suspension of construction or dismantling of the radar.

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The President's February 7, 1985, Report to the Congress contained the following finding:

The US Government judges, on the basis of evidence which continued to be available through 1984, that the new large phased-array radar under construction at Krasnoyarsk constitutes a violation of legal obligations under the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 in that in its associated siting, orientation, and capability, it is prohibited by this Treaty. Continuing construction and the absence of credible alternative explanations, have reinforced our assessment of its purpose. Despite US requests, no corrective action has been taken.

All agencies agree that this matter should be pursued in SCC-XXIX. Approval of the recommended approach is needed.

Consensus Recommendation:

All agencies agree the US Component should pursue the question of the Krasnoyarsk radar along the following lines (this approach would not be substantively changed from that used in SCC-XXVIII):

The US Component would again: (1) reiterate the finding of the President's February 1, 1985, Report to Congress that the radar under construction in the vicinity of Krasnoyarsk is a violation of the ABM Treaty, (2) state that the US has very serious concerns about the potential interrelationship of this radar with an ABM system under development that could be rapidly deployed in defense of national territory and with other related Soviet ABM activities, (3) repeat briefly other points made in previous discussions of this issue, (4) emphasize in the strongest terms that corrective action, to include the dismantlement of that radar, is required, and (5) express disappointment with Soviet contribution, thus far, to resolving this matter.

The US Component would continue to press the Soviet side on this matter but would focus on the President's findings and avoid detailed technical discussions, for example, of the alleged space track role.

The US Component would not renew the offer to discuss with experts the application of the Krasnoyarsk radar to manned space programs.

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The US Component could respond along the lines of previous instructions if the Soviets make new and significant information available.

If the Soviet side does not present significant new information regarding the Krasnoyarsk radar, the US Commissioner would be authorized to cease discussion of this matter for this session. In the process, he should make clear to the Soviet side the US assessment of their highly negative contribution and that the issue remains open in the SCC.

B. Encryption of Telemetry


Attempts to resolve the problem of Soviet telemetry encryption continue to make little progress in the SCC or elsewhere. The US side has requested that all encryption of telemetry cease, and has also suggested that the Soviets revert to telemetry transmission practices in effect at the time SALT II was signed. The Soviets have asked the US to designate those channels of telemetry required for such verification. Thus far, the US has been unwilling to provide those parameters.

The President's February 7, 1985, Report to the Congress contains the following finding:

The US Government reaffirms the conclusion in the January 1984 report that Soviet encryption practices constitute a violation of a legal obligation under SALT II prior to 1981 and a violation of their political commitment since 1982. The nature and extent of such encryption of telemetry on new ballistic missiles, despite US requests for corrective action, continues to be an example of deliberately impeding verification of compliance in violation of this Soviet political commitment.

All agencies agree that this matter should be pursued in SCC-XXIX. Approval of the recommended approach is required.

The DCI believes that current Soviet encryption practices are not acceptable and that the USG should say so again in a clear, definitive way. The DCI believes, moreover, that the US should tell the Soviet side that this encryption activity, as well as other activity of similar significance (i.e., concealment), must stop if existing arms control accords are to be preserved and if future arms control arrangements are to be created. And finally, the DCI believes the US should make clear that compliance and verification are the pacing elements of arms control today.

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However, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] the DCI believes that this issue should again be treated "low-key" as was done in SCC-XXVIII. US intelligence defers to the Commissioner's judgment on the timing of treatment of this issue in this session." (For clarity, "low-key" is compatible with the strong message in the previous paragraph.)

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Consensus Recommendation:

All agencies agree that the US approach should be along the following lines (this approach is substantively unchanged from that taken in SCC-XXVIII):

The US Component would repeat the President's finding from the February 1 Report to Congress regarding Soviet telemetry encryption which impedes verification and call for a halt to such encryption. The US Component would again note that the expanding pattern of Soviet violation of the concealment prohibition of SALT II is of great military and political significance and that continuation of Soviet concealment activities will make it difficult, if not impossible, to verify compliance with future arms control agreements and will lower confidence in the potential utility of those agreements.

The US Component would continue to press the Soviets to revert to pre-1979 practices, along the following lines used in SCC-XXVIII:

The US component would again (1) inform the Soviet side that Soviet telemetry encryption practices in effect at the time of the signing of the SALT II Treaty (June 1979) were carefully evaluated by the US side with respect to our ability to monitor ballistic missile systems limited by SALT II; (2) emphasize that the Soviet Union has, since the time of the signing of the SALT II Treaty, significantly altered its telemetry encryption

[REDACTED] is therefore a violation of the political commitment to the Treaty; (3) indicate that the Soviet ability to construe SALT II provisions in order to "change the rules in the middle of the game" is a major shortcoming of the Treaty and contrary to the spirit with which we signed it in June 1979; and (4) state that, therefore, in order to reduce obstacles to reaching new agreements, the Soviet side should revert to the telemetry transmission practices in effect on that date.

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The US Component would again qualify this response along the following lines:

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C. SS-X-25

The Soviets continue to maintain that the RS-12M (SS-X-25) is not a new type missile. At the beginning of SCC-XXVIII, the Soviets informed us that 18 SS-X-25 mobile ICBM launchers had been deployed.

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The President's February 7, 1985, Report to the Congress contained the following findings:

a. Second New Type: The US Government judges [redacted]

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[redacted] that the SS-X-25 is a prohibited second "new type" of ICBM and that its testing, in addition to the testing of the SS-X-24 ICBM, thereby is a violation of the Soviet Union's political commitment to observe the "new type" provision of the SALT II Treaty.

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On June 10, 1985, in promulgating his decision on continued adherence to a policy of interim restraint, the President cited the SS-X-25 as an example of irreversible Soviet noncompliance with the Treaty.

All agencies agree that this matter should be pursued in SCC-XXIX. Approval of the recommended approach is required.

Consensus Recommendation

All agencies believe that the approach in SCC-XXIX should be along the following lines:

The US Component would (1) reiterate the findings of the President's February 1, 1985, Report to Congress which states that the SS-X-25 is a second "new type" ICBM in violation of the political commitment; (2) state that this violation is irreversible because knowledge gained cannot be eradicated, and (3) reiterate the President's statement of June 10, 1985, that,

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"Since the noncompliance associated with the development of this missile cannot, at this point, be corrected by the Soviet Union, the United States, therefore, reserves the right to respond appropriately, and the United States will do so in a proportionate manner at the appropriate time." The US Component would not pursue the matter further.

D. SNDV Limits

The President's Report to the Congress on February 7, 1985, included the following finding:

The US Government interprets the Soviet commitment to abide by SALT II as including the existence of a cap on SNDVs--at the level of 2504 existing at the time SALT II was signed. The Soviet Union has deployed SNDVs above the 2504 cap in violation of its political commitment under SALT II. Such activity is indicative of a Soviet policy inconsistent with this political commitment.

During SCC-XXVIII, the US side informed the Soviet side of its concerns. The Soviet side responded that the 1979 levels "... had never been exceeded." In a letter dated August 5, 1985, the Soviet Commissioner added that "...with the entry of new heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers, heavy bombers of old types ("Myasishchev") were converted into tanker airplanes. Conversion was carried out in accordance with practice used before the signature of the SALT II Treaty. As a gesture of good will, I am informing you at the same time that we are destroying some of the "Myasishchev" tanker airplanes as their usefulness is exhausted."

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All agencies agree that this matter should be pursued in SCC-XXIX. Approval of the recommended approach is required.

Consensus Recommendation

All agencies agree that the approach should be along the following lines:

If the Soviet SNDV count is over 2504, based on intelligence information and the Soviet notification in October, the US Commissioner would again note the commitment of the Soviet Union to abide by the provisions of the SALT II Treaty and that that includes the commitment to limit their SNDVs to the number they had on the date of signature of the SALT II Treaty and included in the agreed data base on strategic arms of that date. The US Commissioner would again note that for the Soviet side this number is 2504. The US Component would note the response provided by the Soviet Commissioner on August 5, 1985, and state that the US continues to have evidence which indicates that the number of SNDVs deployed in the Soviet Union and accountable under the provisions of the SALT II Treaty has exceeded 2504 in violation of the Soviet Union's political commitment.

The US Commissioner would be authorized to engage the Soviet side in dialogue on the Soviet Commissioner's letter of August 5, 1985, along the following lines:

-- The US Commissioner would state that, on the basis of information available, the US side does not accept the Soviet side's contention that Bison aircraft have been converted from bombers to tankers.

-- The US Commissioner would also draw from the following questions:

-- Describe the "practice" by which the Soviet Union said it has converted Bison bombers to tankers.

-- How would such tanker aircraft be distinguished from Bison bomber aircraft? Are they to be distinguished from Bison bomber aircraft on the basis of functionally related observable differences (FRODs), and if so, what are the FRODs?

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
-- How many aircraft does the Soviet side claim to have converted?

-- What procedures does the Soviet side follow to destroy Bison aircraft?

If the combination of the Soviet notification and current intelligence information indicates that the Soviets are at or below 2504, the US Commissioner would be authorized to ask the questions listed above but would request guidance from Washington on the overall SNDV issue.

The US Component would be authorized to draw upon the SCC Working Group paper, "Preparation for SCC-XXVIII: Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles Limit," March 13, 1985, and the update of that paper dated September 3, 1985, as appropriate.

E. SAM Upgrade



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The President's February 7, 1985, Report contained the following finding:

The US Government judges that the evidence of Soviet actions with respect to SAM upgrade is insufficient to assess compliance with the Soviet Union's obligations under the ABM Treaty. However, this and other ABM related Soviet activities suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

During SCC-XXVIII, the US side expressed concern about research and development at a test range, historically associated with the development of surface-to-air missiles, on new air defense missiles with capabilities against some types of ballistic missiles and requested clarification regarding how this activity is consistent with Article VI (a) of the ABM Treaty. The possibility that this activity could result in "providing ABM capability" to new air defense missiles was noted.



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Soviet side responded that the allegation was conjecture, that the Soviet side did not know precisely what the US concern was based on, and, therefore, could provide no substantive response. The Soviet side denied that it is conducting any work on air defense systems that would be contrary to the ABM Treaty.

All agencies agree that this subject should be pursued in SCC-XXIX. Approval of the recommended approach is required.

Consensus Recommendation:

All agencies agree that the approach in SCC-XXIX should be along the following lines (except for the authorization to specify the SA-X-12 designator, the approach would be substantively unchanged from that taken in SCC-XXVIII):

The US Component would reiterate its concerns regarding Soviet research and development, at a test range historically associated with surface-to-air missiles, on new air defense missiles with capabilities against some types of ballistic missiles and express dissatisfaction with Soviet responses provided thus far. The US Component would again cite the provisions of Article VI that prohibits giving systems other than ABM systems capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles and the provision against testing such systems in an ABM mode and again request clarification regarding how this research and development program is consistent with these provisions. The US Component would again emphasize the importance of the SAM upgrade issue in the context of other Soviet actions which suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

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The DCI believes there are risks to intelligence sources and methods in this issue but it is possible, if a decision is made to pursue this issue with the USSR, to do so with minimal risk.

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F. Mobile ABM System Components

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The President's Report, February 7, 1985, to the Congress included the following findings:

The US Government judges

that the USSR's development and testing of components of an ABM system, which apparently are designed to be deployable at sites requiring relatively little or no special-purpose site preparation, represent a potential violation of its legal obligation under the ABM Treaty. These and other ABM-related Soviet activities suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

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All agencies agree that this matter should be pursued in SCC-XXIX. Approval of the recommended approach is required.

Consensus Recommendation:

All agencies agree that the approach should be pursued along the following lines (this approach is substantively unchanged from that taken in SCC-XXVIII):

The US Component would again indicate the US concern, as stated in the finding of the President's Report to Congress, is that the USSR's development of components of an ABM system, which apparently are designed to be deployable at sites requiring relatively little or no preparation, represents a potential violation of its legal obligation under the ABM Treaty, and that this and other ABM-related Soviet actions suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

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[redacted] The US Component would repeat that the Soviet assertions that the Soviet Union is not developing mobile ABM components and its statement that the US had evidently observed a radar used as instrumentation equipment and for national technical means of verification were accompanied by no supporting evidence. The US would again state that the US will continue to believe this to be an ABM radar possibly associated with the development of a rapidly-deployable, mobile ABM system, until and unless provided with unambiguous information to the contrary.

The US Component would be authorized to draw upon the SCC Working Group Paper, "Preparations for SCC-XXVIII: Soviet Mobile ABM System Components," dated May 6, 1985, and the update of that paper dated September 3, 1985, in pursuing this approach.

The DCI believes there are risks to intelligence sources and methods in this issue but it is possible, if a decision is made to pursue this issue with the USSR, to do so with minimal risk.

[redacted]

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G. Preagreed Messages for the Common Understanding on Unexplained Nuclear Incidents.

At the final meeting of SCC-XXVIII, the US side stated that the US continued to believe that new messages specifically tailored to the Common Understanding on Unexplained Nuclear Incidents would facilitate urgent communication between the two governments in situations covered by the Common Understanding, and added that the US may return to this question in the future. The Soviet Commissioner stated that the sides, "if necessary, may return to the question of working out an additional message or additional messages...." Subsequently, at the plenary table, the Soviet Commissioner asked if he understood correctly that, in connection with this Common Understanding, the Parties would be using, if necessary, the appropriate messages already contained in the (1976) Protocol. The US Commissioner confirmed that this was correct.

Consensus Recommendation

All agencies agree that this item should not be pursued in SCC-XXIX.

Consensus Approach

All agencies agree that our approach should be along the following lines:

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The US Component would not raise this matter at SCC-XXIX. If the subject is raised by the Soviet side, the US Component would be authorized to repeat the position taken in SCC-XXVIII that the preagreed messages contained in the 1976 Protocol continue to be sufficient for the time being. The US Component would retain the option to return to this matter in the future.

V. How to Respond to Compliance Concerns Previously Raised by the Soviet Union

Instructions will be drafted for the following issues previously raised by the Soviets and on which US positions have been established. Should the Soviets present new material not covered by instructions, the US Component would seek Washington guidance.

A. Article XII of the SALT II Treaty: The deployment of Pershing II and GLCMs in Western Europe.

B. ABM Testing Activities: These activities involve the Homing Overlay Experiment, the Designated Optical Tracker, Queen Match, and the Signature Measurements Radar.

C. Pave Paws Radars: The Soviets raised issues regarding the characteristics and coverage of these radars.

D. Strategic Defense Initiative: The Soviets have raised this issue in several past sessions of the SCC as a violation of the ABM Treaty.

E. Modernization of the Thule and Fylingdales Radars: The Soviets raised concerns regarding the construction of the Thule radar.

F. Titan II Launchers: The Soviets have accused the US of violating ICBM launcher dismantling or destructing procedures.

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